I see a lot of talk about “expert”/“professional” LPs. To me, it’s a bit of an overstatement. There’s nothing really expert about maintaining tight, if possible even single tick liquidity. There are thousands of such “experts”. This is how all pools on Uniswap v3 work. LP only get fees from liquidity in the active tick. Yes, Uni v3 is much more complex than v2, I can agree with that, but there’s nothing inherently more expert in a way GivFarm for v3 works. We’re not talking about gamma hedging with options or “flash liquidity” (those are hot topics among real pros here), we’re talking about regular LPs on v3. Yeah, this is not for everyone, especially when gas is expensive, but it’s not just for people with math/finance/quantum physics PhD and billions in wallets.
Those rewards (no matter if we mean Uniswap fees or GIV rewards) don’t come for nothing. There’s one thing that it’s almost completely missing from this conversation, which is the risk. LPs in such tight ranges are subject to very high impermanent loss risk.
Overall I think current structure is quite OK.
There’s passive, no risk staking for GIV, there’s low risk Balancer pool, and there’s high risk Uniswap v3 pool.
The snapshot has passed with unanimous Yes’s. This forum post was linked in the vote, so the entire discussion was available to everyone.
We will be asking people to claim their rewards via Twitter, Discord, comms in general. If they do not claim by March 21, before we shut off the rewards, we will take a snapshot of the stakers and rewards earned and distribute them (via GIVbacks, most likely) so that the people who earned can get their rewards.
OK, I don’t know all the details, but isn’t it just possible to leave it as “disabled” pool with only option to Unstake and Harvest? (Don’t forget about Unstake option!)
As the time for claiming aproaches, we should be mindful of the number of people that have managed to unstake their positions. If the percentage is still too low, we could consider extending the cutoff deadline by a small amount of time (12h?) to allow stragglers to catch up.
I’m not sure if this would be considered as a breach of the agreed upon proposal, but it’s worth considering in my opinion.
People will still be able to unstake afterwards, and we have the data to send the rewards to everyone who didn’t harvest, right? We’re able to hit “go” on the multsig tx.
Then I realized that this vote was long past, and the new one is for preventing the 3 addresses that capture most of the rewards to terminate their streamed rewards.
I turned my vote to “Abstain” for now. I’m uncomfortable with this decision and I would like to have more information. It is admitted here that the design of the rewards system was inadequate. I’m not a maximalist at all when it comes to immutability, but it’s troubling to me that rewards duly acquired by playing the rules (and taking the risk of IL) could be blocked that way. I also agree with comments above emphasizing the fact that liquidity rewards are, well, for providing liquidity, and as we say in French, l’argent n’a pas d’odeur" - “money has no smell”. Ensuring that the token distribution targets the people aligned with the project’s purpose is a different objective, there are already other mechanisms in place to that end. I don’t like the “middle finger” characterization, even though I found it funny. But it’s complicated to attract economically rational actors with money-making mechanisms, only to tell them after they succeed that they were bad guys who will be punished because they were too good at it (and I’m saying this as someone staking or giving all my GIV and never selling any up to now).
To make it short, here’s what I’d love to learn about in order to make my final decision:
did these addresses already receive a substantial reward out of their LP activity? How does it compare to what’s left and that we want to block?
why wasn’t it a dedicated post to discuss this particular decision? or maybe I missed it and the link in snapshot was just the wrong one?
do we have any idea of the risk created by a sell pressure of 2.6M GIV on the project? Secondary markets are also a way to increase the distribution of a token. The main issue is to see the token tanking, not that it’s accumulated by a few actors, since they seem selling anyway.
Complementary comment: I contribute to a project that will enable market making strategies (à la Uni V3, or more sophisticated ones) to be democratized. It if succeeds, “middle finger” people’s interests will be aligned with those of any non-expert willing to provide liquidity, and get rewarded for it. Not available in the short term though.
@bobsledder23@reuptaken and anyone interested in market making strategies, I’d love to pick up your brain if the idea appeals to you
