GIVgarden Parameters

Hey GIVninjas!

Mitch, Griff and I had a hack session to choose the parameters for Conviction Voting and Tao Voting for the GIVgarden.

Conviction Voting will be used to vote on proposals that are requesting funding from the DAO.

Tao Voting will be used to vote on proposals that are proposing changes to the DAO itself, for example, to vote on proposals that are suggesting to change these parameters later.

I made some comments in the spreadsheet with short definitions of each of the parameters, but if you want more detail, there are a bunch of great posts in the TEC forum that explain them in more detail.

This post is here for advice process. If you have any feedback or questions on any of the parameters chosen, let’s discuss here!

FYI If you’re interested in getting more familiar too, I would highly recommend joining a TEC param party (check out the calendar here), and playing with the Commons Configuration Dashboard (CCD). The CCD is a tool developed by the TEC specifically to educate people on these (and other) economic parameters.


I’d raise the challenge deposit to 10k.
It’s not much more than suggested but is a round number, slightly higher to make the challenge not harder but maybe more worth it. Not sure if that small adjustment would make that difference psychologically.


I was actually in a BrightID call this morning where they mentioned that they had someone “challenge” a proposal “just to see how it worked”… without any basis for the challenge… delaying a perfectly good proposal over a week. I think making the challenge deposit prohibitively expensive makes sense, but also, their challenge deposit was only $50.

With that, we’d have the proposal deposit 5000 GIV, and the challenge deposit 10,000 GIV… So it’s twice as much to challenge as it is to propose.

Interested to hear your thoughts @mitch @Griff

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I agree with Marko and yourself

10k is good for me :+1:

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I like this 5k proposal 10k challenge.

Curious if it has to be an individual to challenge, can alliances be formed to do this?
I’m assuming it can but, one person would have to be the one to do it.
People could give tokens to a challenge representative to take it on though I tink.

yeah, only one person can challenge. They get the deposit back unless the dispute is raised to Celeste and the Keepers rule against the challenge.

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GIVgarden Parameters Revised (A Technocratic Story)

Alright team, thanks to the Commons Configuration Dashboard, the TEC Param parties, and our friends at 1Hive and BrightID we’ve learned a great deal about parameterizing Tao Voting and Conviction Voting for our GIVgarden.

@mitch @Griff and I have collaborated and to the best of our ability come up with a new proposal for our GIVgarden parameters. The parameters and their explanation shall be outlined below:

Tao Voting Fundamental Strategy:

Tao Voting is the decision making process that governs proposals to make changes to the GIVgarden. It can change garden parameters, it can change the rewards program for GIV stakers on xDai, it can send the funds from the GIVgarden common pool (33% of the total supply of GIV) anywhere & more!

We are proposing to launch the GIVgarden & our token with an initial set of parameters that allows our team to pass Tao Votes quickly in case we need to put out any fires (like change the rewards contract for the garden or make any quick changes to the Conviction Voting settings). Bearing in mind that our GIVdrop is going a “trusted seed” of Giveth donors, users & friends, it should be relatively easy to mobilize the crew to pass proposals to make changes in the early days with these settings. We chose to start with 10% minimum quorum (relatively easy to achieve with our trusted seed) and a high support required because people may be wrapping tokens and not voting (i.e. staking in the 100% GIV staking pool in the GIVfarm on xDai). The settings are in the spreadsheet below, and also summarized here:

After about 2 weeks, we intend to pass a decision vote (very feasible with our trusted seed) to change these settings to the ones we want to maintain (after putting out initial launch fires). The Minimum Quorum is “TBD” because we intend to see what percentage of the initial liquid supply that people decided to wrap (and therefore have count towards the “total supply” for the GIVgarden). This quorum includes tokens wrapped in the garden & voting on proposals AND tokens that are staked in the xDai GIV staking pool in our GIVfarm UI (even if they are not voting).

Conviction Voting Fundamental Strategy

Conviction Voting is the decision making that rules funding proposals made in the GIVgarden. As outlined in the Covent feedback post these settings govern the way GIV token holders can vote on and pass proposals requesting funds from the GIVgarden common pool (at launch, containing 33% of the total supply of GIV).

Our params were chosen with the following in mind:

  • Conviction Growth: In general, a voter’s conviction roughly maximizes after staking tokens for 4 x conviction grown (days) - we set a conviction growth of 8 days… so conviction maxes out and begins to plateau around 1 month. Proposals sitting for longer than that without additional support get kind of stale.

  • BrightID currently has an effective supply of 12% of their total. Our economy will be of a similar scale, so we use them as a reference. We assume an effective supply between 0.5 million to 1.7 million GIV (up to ~10% of the liquid GIVdrop amount, and the amount of tokens that we could mobilize and get in the GIVgarden if necessary). A higher effective supply than this would just make it harder for proposals to pass, so this is a good estimate as a minimum.

  • Spending limit: We wanted to maximize it, but in the end, there is about 33 million tokens liquid in the common pool initially and 17 million liquid tokens in circulation at launch (doing anything). We set the spending limit is to 1.25% to ensure that no proposal can pass with less GIV voting on it than it is requesting.

  • Note that, the GIVgarden common pool has a GIVstream (so 90% of it total allocation of tokens is being streamed). The circulating supply of GIV is increasing at a higher rate than the tokens being streamed to the GIVgarden common pool (because it is coming from GIVfarm rewards, GIVbacks rewards, salaries being paid out from the rGIV DAO, etc.). We intend to adjust the spending limit as the proportions of liquid tokens change.

  • We chose these params and simulated outcomes for a proposal of 33,000 GIV (valuing $3300 if GIV is $0.10) which is requesting only 0.1% of the Common Pool at launch (33,000,000 GIV). Assuming the effective supply if 1,700,000 GIV (as above)… this small proposal would be impossible to pass in 8 hours. In 3 days, to pass, it would need about 25% of the effective supply voting on it. In 1 week, 15%… in 2 weeks, 8%… in 1 month about 7% and it plateaus. You can play with simulating different outcomes for different funding requests by playing with the dashboard here.

You can see a screenshot of these params and simulation for 2 weeks here:

Essentially these CV params were chosen to make it relatively easy/feasible to pass small proposals but we’re not giving away the farm in any one proposal. We’re also mitigating the fact that we have no idea what the GIV token price will be at launch. Remember also that we set Tao Voting params to make it relatively easy to update these if there are any surpirses immediately after launch.

The param are also in this spreadsheet:

In conclusion

The Giveth technocracy is satisfied with these as a jumping off point, but are also happy to get your feedback! Please leave any comments here. If there’s no real feedback by Friday, we’ll call this done.


I love the TAO voting phase 1 proposal :slight_smile: So nicely designed!
So far I see no issues with the phase 2 proposal (Minimum quorum TBD) I’m just thinking about vote duration, is 11 days too much or should we make it even longer? What’s the strategy here?

No comments on CV yet, need to deep dive into it. When param party? :slight_smile:


We set vote duration to 5 days.

The total strat is to have proposals be able to pass within a week, even if a quiet ending is triggered (QEE is 2 days).;

Delegates have 3 days to vote, and the QEP is also 3 days… meaning that if delegates vote in the last day of the delegated voting period & flip the vote, it triggers the QEE… meaning that if votes are contentious among delegates, more time is given.

Also looooolll!

Happy to discuss more if you like, also the TV phase 1 makes it so that we can change these right after launch too, so we buy a bit of time.


You can play with the GIVeconomy version of the Dashboard here:

The best part is the Learn Modules:

Conviction Voting

Conviction Voting is the governance system in which GIVers create proposals to request funds from the Common Pool.

GIV can be staked on these proposals to signal approval of the request. Staked tokens accrue voting power, or Conviction, continuously over time. The amount of tokens currently voting on all proposals in Conviction Voting is represented by the term Effective Supply. The logarithmic function that decides the rate at which Conviction accumulates is Conviction Growth.

This is the real power behind the GIV token. GIVers have a direct impact on deciding the Future of Giving by reviewing projects and voting on which initiatives get funded and how much GIV they receive.

The Spending Limit sets the maximum percentage of the Common Pool funds that can be requested by a single proposal. The Minimum Conviction dictates how many GIV are needed to pass a proposal, no matter how small the amount requested.

Tao Voting

As the GIVeconomy evolves so should its configuration. Parameters within the GIVgarden will be able to be modified during deployment. In this module you will need to define the voting requirements for any proposal to alter the GIVgarden on-chain configuration.

Modifying the GIVgarden

Tao Voting is the voting application by which the GIVers can modify the economic and governance settings of the GIVgarden. It is a very powerful voting application that is capable of performing many high-impact Decisions, for example:

  • Install and remove Aragon Applications
  • Modify the parameters of all existing Applications
  • Remove GIV from the Common Pool

Since there is only one set of voting parameters for all GIVgarden components, well-thought out thresholds for passing proposals in Tao Voting are critical to ensure the GIVgarden architecture remains uncompromised.

Tao Voting is an upgraded version of a normal DAO Voting app with familiar parameters such as Support Required, Minimum Quorum, Execution Delayand Vote Duration.

Tao Voting also comes with two new concepts: Delegation and Quiet Ending.


GIV holders can delegate their Tao Voting powers to another member who will cast votes on their behalf, these members become delegates. Delegates can only vote during the Delegate Voting Period, which is a specified amount of time at the beginning of the voting process. If a delegate votes contrary to their delegator the delegator can veto the delegated vote and cast their vote themselves. Any voter, delegate or otherwise, can only vote ONCE.

Quiet Ending

In the latter portion of the Vote Duration there’s a designated Quiet Ending Period (QEP). If during this period the vote outcome is flipped the Quiet Ending Extension (QEE) will trigger. The QEE will add more time to the voting period, giving eligible members who have not yet voted more time to do so. If the vote outcome flips again during QEE then another QEE will trigger, adding more time to vote. Voting closes only when the QEP or QEE ends without the vote outcome flipping.